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RECOLLECTION'S 



t%% Mmmnu Satttiiiiign, 



BATTLE OF CAMPBELL STATION, 16th Nov., 1863 
SIEGE OF KNOXVILLE, 17th Nov. — 5th Dec, 1863. 



n 

5- 



^ BY 

WILL? H^^BREAELEY, 



4 V 
ILL? H^ : 



CO. E., 17th MICH. VOLS. 



• DETROIT: 

TRIBUNE BOOK AKD JOB OFFICE, 

1871. 






Deteoit, April 28th, 1871. 

I have examined the statements of facts contained in 
this article, and find them unusually accurate, so far as they 
cover the ground. 

O. M. POE, 
Major of Engineers, and Brevet Brig. Gen'l, U. S. A. 
Late Chief Engineer, Army of the Ohio. 



In the following Sketches, I cannot, consistantly, make turther 
pretension, than that of picturing my own experiences, which neces- 
sarily were largely confined within the limits of my own regiment. 

That justice may not have been done some equally or more deserv- 
ing regiments, and that the skeleton of facts, upon which the fol- 
lowing incidents are based, may be imcomplete through the omis- 
sion of some detail, there can be little doubt. The desire to preserve 
the Incidents I have hitherto carried in my memory, and to make 
acknowledgment where justice demanded it, has been my only 
motive in oflFeriug this article to my comrades and those who are 
interested in the East Tennessee Campaign. 

I have been greatly aided through the courtesy of Generals A. 
E. Burnside, O. M. Poe, and F. W. Swift, who have granted me 
privileges of conversation and free access to data in their posses- 
sion ; and also, to Generals James Longstreet and E. P. Alexander, 
of the Confederate service, who kindly gave me permission to pub- 
lish portions of a private correspondence. 

Extracts have been made, by permission, from " Burnside and 
the Ninth Army Corps," a very complete work published by 
" Woodbury," and from an article published in the " Atlantic 
Monthly," of July, 1865 ; for which favors I am deeply grateful. 

AUTHOR. 



*♦* Copies will be forwarded — post paid — on receipt of forty cents. 
Address, 

WILL. H. BREARLEY, 

• Detroit, Michigan. 



EAST TENI^ESSEE OAMPAIGK 



Recollections of the Battle of Campbell Station and 
the Siege of Knoxville. 



\<|^/jr ARCHING three weeks through the Cumberland 
4-T;4;'> and Clinch Mountains in mid-summer, had pi-epared 

■■M^(A me to enjoy a plunge in the Holston, and for once 
c the object realized did not fall short of my anticijia- 
tions. I did not even regret to part with my collection of 
specimens ot the soil, which I had gathered from day to day, 
along the mountain roads, and which I now saw floating away 
and giving a peculiar color to the water, but an overpowering 
sense of cleanliness made me sincere when I said, " water is 
my greatest bodily comfort, and, while I stay near this river, I 
shall live in constant luxury." 

If I should follow the marching and counter-marching, of 
the Ninth Army Corps, up and down the valley of the Hols- 
ton, during the summer of 1863, I should have to confess to a 
life of constant dissipation ; no watering place had ever one 
half the attractions of that placid old river, whether it was in 
the morning when half the corps Avas bathing and the com- 
bined voice and muscle of thousands of men were disturbing 
its decorum, or, when the moon and I were standing picket 
upon its opposite shores, that I admired it most, I never fully 
decided. 

Having one morning formed the determination to cross 
to the south side of the river, for the purpose of climbing 



4 EA.ST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN, 

the heights, to obtain a view of the country, I stepped on the 
ferry, at the foot ot one of the streets of Knoxville, and was 
swiftly carried to the further side. 

A stretch of half a mile of low plats, and then the country 
rose abruptly into bluffs, which are inaccessible except by roads 
that occur in two or three places. I climbed the highest of 
these bluffs, and found it to be the greatest of a range of sep- 
arate blufis divided by deep ravines. Burnside had already 
^earned its importance and preparations were being made to 
fortify it. From there I had a magnificent view of the coun. 
try about Knoxville, which has been truly called the most 
beautiful part of East Tennessee. 

The route of the Holston could be easily traced to the south- 
west, and the Louden heights, thirty-two miles distant, could 
be distinctly seen, as they rise to mark the place where the 
Holston river, coming down from the east, unites with the 
Little Tennessee, and forms the Tennessee river. 

Knoxville is situated on the north bank of the Holston and in 
its immediate vicinity, to the north, east and west, is a suc- 
cession of hills, to some extent used as sites for suburban resi- 
dences. On one of these hills, to the northwest of the city, an 
unfinished earth work was found when the place was first occu- 
pied by our forces. This was being completed, and under the 
direction of Col. O. M. Poe, chief engineer on the staff of Maj. 
Gen'l. A. E, Burnside, three other earth works were being 
thrown up to defend the city against cavalry dashes — one to 
the north and one to the east of the city, and the third was 
located on my lookout, the bluff, on the south side of the river. 

Beyond the hills, to the north, were the buildings of the 
Tennessee valley railroad. I had cause to remember this 
railroad and took a peculiar interest in watching a train going 
west. I had been subjected to several trips backwards and 
forwai'ds from Knoxville to Louden, and remembered having, 
in a number of instances, to get off and help pusli the train 
over a grade, and the next moment find th-^ train going, at a 
terrific rate, down the opposite grade, and know that the 
engine, although reversed, could not seriously impede it. 



EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 5 

The first resting place those unfortunate passengers would 
find, I knew, would be fifteen miles out at Cam})bell station, 
and the second at Lenoir station, twenty-three miles distant. 
Nine miles further on, the bridge across the Tennessee river 
had been burned, and the novelty of getting out and walking 
across on a pontoon bridge would assist them in appreciating 
the beauties of the village of Louden. 

Half way between the railroad and the river, a wagon road 
runs west from Knoxville, Avhich I had frequently had the 
pleasure of exploring in light marching order. At Campbell 
station the road divides, one fork following the railroad 
through Lenoir station, to Loudon, and the other running di- 
rect to Kingston, which is about fifteen miles north of Louden. 

From Louden to Chattanooga, I knew that the country was 
occujDied by poitions of the Confederate Army, under Bragg, 
and the almost insurmountable barriers of Lookout Mountain 
and Mission Ridge stood across the way of communications 
with Grant. 

Scouts had been out on a road that ran south from the 
ferry, past the foot of the bluff, to Marysville, twenty miles dis- 
tant, but no troops had crossed to occupy the country except 
those required to fortify the bluff. 

On the east, our out-j'osts had not passed far beyond Green- 
ville, sixty miles distant. 

There was but one line of communication open with the 
North, a wagon road, running north, through the mountains, 
one hundred and sixty miles to Nicholasville, Kentucky. 

I could see the dim outlines of Cumberland gap in the far 
north, the place where, on our way into Tennesee, I had 
enjoyed the rai'e felicity of sitting in three states at once 
and where I had my first view and formed my first im- 
pressions of Tennessee. Half a day's march soutli of there was 
where I saw a cojnpany of men, women and children from 
" up in the mountains," who had come to S3e the " Yankees." 
The women and children rode on the backs of cows, and one 
look at the grou^j — the women mounted on home-made saddles 



6 EA.ST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 

holding the reins, which were fastened to hits in the cow's 
moutli, .1 cliikl astride the cow's neck in front, and two or 
three hehind hokling on to their mothers, the men in ancient 
raiment, unshaved and unwashed, leaning on their cattle-goads, 
and all looking with undisguised wondei- at the " fao end " of 
Yanlcees — one look at such a grotesque group was enough to 
make one doubt his mother country. 

At the end of that day's march we had learned another 
secret of the land we were exploring. Every house in 
Tennessee, to he properly supplied with the necessaries of life, 
must have a barrel of " apple-jack." * We had to leave at that 
place a few of our boys to rest from the fatigue of the march 
and overtake us at their leisurfe. 

But I had no desire to review our march from that place to 
this ; that, with all our subsequent wanderings, were absorbed 
in the one thought of our present situation. While the Con- 
federate army should remain engaged in watching the move- 
ment of Grant in the West, and Meade in Virginia, we might 
hold our almost undisputed control over East Tennessee. But 
should they make a determined effort to retake it, the metal 
of our corps would be undoubtedly tested. 

AlthoU':>;h our resources were limited and our communication 
with the North uncertain, I think this view and review made 
me mao-nify our strength, for I detected no thought of doubt 
as I started back to camp — nothing but unqualified confidence 
in our leader " Old Burnie," (as the men familiarly called 
him,) and in the efficacy of our rifles. 

If my old friend, the river, had revealed the future to me, as 
faithfully as it did the present, wlien I looked into it, going 
back, I would have doubted the character of truthfulness, 
which I had ascribed to it. 

Any one who thinks there ia an atom of romance in camp 
life, must be so far removed from it by time or distance, as 
not to remember or see the thousand and one things so distress- 

* Apple Brandy. 



EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 7 

ing to Yankee independence. Neither time nor distance have 
been kind enongh to me to make nje forget the unpleasant 
sensations I experienced, the next morning alter tliis trip, ui)OU 
hearing tlie " orderlie " call out at the door of my tent " wake 
\\\), orders to march." 

I had slept without resting, and a breakfast before sunrise 
did not improve ray feelings which were evidently in perfect 
sympathy with the whole regiment. Of course we grumbled at 
every thing that occured — at the cook's cofiee, at the marching 
orders, at the weight of our knapsacks, which were heavy with 
rolls of damp tent cloths, at an extra twenty rounds of cart- 
ridge that were issued, but which were "used in action "* with- 
in the following fifteen minutes, and at the necessity of carry- 
ini*- five days' rations, which were promptly on hand and 
distributed, and then our tried patience became entirely ex- 
hausted, when we sat around waiting to hear the call to 
" attention " till nearly noon, with no tents or trees to shelter 
us from the sun. 

One of Company E then found it necessary to "shy" a 
^" hardtack " at one of Company K, who had spread himself 
out on a bunk and gone to sleep, with his knapsack for a pillow 
and his hat for a sunshade — unfortunately, the aim was at 
fault, for, instead of knocking ofi" the hat with true soldier like 
precision, after describing a graceful curve through the air, the 
" hardtack " dealt the dreamer a graceless hard knock on the 
bead. I do not remember the exact order of events that fol- 
lowed. First I dodged an old boot, next a handful of cartridges 
and then, reinforcements coming up, the engagement became 
general, and the air became dark with every missile that the 
camp grounds aftbrded, and the cast off apparel, old tin cans, 
etc., of the left wing, exchanged places with those of the 
right. A few getting hurt, and the Colonel coming out to see 
what whs the matter, an end was made of the nonsense, and 
the late combatants turned upon their haversacks with appe- 
tites made good by the exercise. — The few that thought they 

* (iuaileimapter's way ol' uccoiuitiuL;- for misisiug articles. 



8 EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 

might venture to go for water before they Avoukl be called to 
attention, hastely gathei'ed up a few canteens, and started for 
the spring, while others broke up their bunks and made fires 
to cook coffee, Avhen the water should be b.rought. 

There are few soldiers who cannot appreciate our next greiv- 
ance, '' marching orders countermanded," and just before sun- 
set, we fell to work " pitching tents " over the ruins, grumb- 
ling because we did not march. 

Notwithstanding these, and many other, real and fancied 
troubles, our leader preserved his well earned popularity. I 
doubt, however, if the pulse of the corps ever beat more grate- 
fully at the mention of the name of Burnside, than it did, when 
by his general order, it was announced that the troops were 
going into winter quarters at Lenoir Station and that one 
man from each company was to go North on recruiting service. 

The Ninth Corps — Brig. Gen. Robt. B. Potter, com- 
manding — was assigned a location in a forest of second 
growth pine in the immediate vicinity of the station. Brig. 
Gen. White's division of the Twenty-third Corps was divided 
— one brigade (Chapin's) occupied ground midway between 
the station and Louden — and the remaining brigade was 
dispatched to Kingston.* Two batteries and about 700 
cavalry, under General Sanders, were sent to occupy the de- 
fenses at Knoxville. Burnside's (Department) headquarters 
and the headquarters of the Ninth and Twenty-third Corps 
were located at Lenoir station. 

Winter quarters speedily developed — a forest of second 
growth pine was converted into a multitude of six by ten, 
one-half story log houses, arranged like a regiment marching 
in " column by companies," with the " distances " policed and 
graded into company streets. But before there had been 
more done thf.n to secure the required number of logs with 
which to build, a good many felt as if they ought to be 
"looking around." I looked around. I looked first in the 
direction of an old house I remembered having j^assed on 

* Which place they fortified aud held during the rest of the lall. 



EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. » 

our march, and, being near sighted, I was compelled to go 
quite to tlie house to see it distinctly. I found that my 
hopes had been anticipated by others who had resolved the 
building into two or three dozen heaps, each of which was 
surmounted by its owner and proprietor, who, with camp 
philosophy, was patiently awaiting till his delay in returning 
should convince his comrade in camp that he had found some- 
thing too " heavy " to manage alone, and who would come 
to his assistance. Not a board or brick remained, and I 
was compelled to look further. Seeing a man emerge from a 
piece of woods near by, dragging a wide board, I followed 
back on his trail, and soon I'eached an old deserted negro 
shanty. Nothing else was so attractive as the door, and 
being satisfied that it would make a superb bunk, it was soon 
thereafter added to my home luxuries. Talking of luxuries, 
no home comfort was ever enjoyed more than the sleeping 
qualities of that old door. 

When house building was at last finished, we prepared to 
enjoy camp life to its fullest extent. I had secured enough 
brick to build a fire-place and chimney ; a I'ack over and be- 
hind the bunk was convenient for my gun and accoutrements, 
while a cupboard, made from a cracker box, over the foot, 
and a shelf over the head for writing material, completed my 
internal arrangements. 

I regarded said arrangements with a lively satisfaction on 
the evening of the day following their completion. I was 
utterly weary from the excitement and labor of building, but 
a letter from home, a generous meal, a good fire, and the 
anticipation of rest, were compensation. 

The weather had all along been propitious, but a storm 
setting in just after dark made me thankful that I had been 
so expeditious in building. First the day's accumulation of 
leaves in the camp were blown away, then the heavy dashes 
of rain against the side of the tent, were sure indications of 
the commencement ol a severe storm. The first fall of rain 
made me aware of the error I had committed in using a 
2 



10 EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 

* 
milldewed piece of tent for that part of the roof above the 
head of the bunk, for the rain came patteriniE? through with- 
out any very great interruption. However I was too weary 
to either attempt to change it, or to move myself, and after 
pulling my I'ubber blanket over my head, I lay a few 
minutes listening to the dropping of the water, the wind 
rushing and whistling outside, and the coals in the fire place 
snapping angrily at the rain dropping down the chimney, and 
then all was silent — no — all was not silent, for over the fury 
of the storm, in successive waves, that broke unceasingly 
against the side of my tent came the sound of the regiment 
heavily and rapidly snoring ; at one time either flank were 
engaged while the center was turning ; then the center, rapidly 
rallying, would assume the brunt of the action, while the 
sound, right and left, grew fainter and fainter, until a report, 
like a command, would come ringing along down the lines, 
followed by a general discharge of the entire command. 
Who, that has ever heard it, will ever forget the sound of a 
regiment snoring ? I cannot recall the stages by which I 
returned to consciousness. 

A no very gentle hand was shaking me, and it was 
attached to a figure bearing unmistakable resemblance to our 
orderlie. He said, " I have been here twice before, and if 
you don't turn out now I will have to pull you out." I in- 
quired what lie wanted, but he had told me " twice before," 
and what he wanted was for me to ''turn out." A murmur 
that arose from all parts of the camp helped to bring me to 
an upright position, and, my guest retiring, I went out, and 
although it was not yet light and the rain was still falling in 
torrents, most of the men were up, preparing their breakfast 
and beginning to " pack up," for we were to march at Jive. 

Just at the first breaking of day, a wet, sleepy, cross and 
much abused regiment of men started towards Knoxville. 

Very little was known of the cause of this movement, and 
very little disposition was shoAvn to learn it. Some specu- 
lated that we were going to Knoxville to fortify the place, 



EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. H 

and do "garrison duty," others, tliat the corps was going 
noith, and alter being recruited, woukl rejoin the " Army of 
the Potomac," while the report that the march was made 
necessary by the advance of the enemy was little credited, 
and the men were satisfied by trying to make themselves as 
uncomfortable as they had expected to be comfortable. 

The movement was in accordance with orders that had been 
issued by General White, who was temporarily in command 
during the absence of General Burnside, at Knoxville. The 
latter, however, sent a telegram countermanding the orders 
given, and an hour later, when an engine and tender, bearing 
the General, came down, the columns were about faced, and 
leaving the wagon trains corralled near Lenoir, the infantry 
and artillery took up their line of march towards Louden. 
Notwithstanding the continued rain and the "heavy" roads, 
the presence of our commander had produced a noticable 
change in the spirit of the troops. An hour before, the men 
were deliberately covering themselves with mud, as if that 
were an appropriate mourning for their departed hopes, and 
their guns seemed to naturally seek a " reversed " position. 

Now, the men were all animation, and a slip here, or a fall 
there, was made the cause of laughing, notwithstanding the 
rain. I think the secret of it was that we reposed an almost 
perfect confidence in our leader, a confidence resulting from 
long and tried associations. 

Few corps commanders have ever won the affection and 
confidence of their men as Burnside did — we never found 
cause to think our confidence misplaced. 

The troops under his command did not exceed 8,000 men ; 
one division of the Ninth corps being left in Kentucky and 
the other two divisions having been greatly reduced by fre- 
quent skirmishing and the excessive fatigues incident to 
active field serN ice. There were not more than 5,500 men of the 
corps " present for duty." White's division of the 2M\ corps, 
numbering about 3,000 men, were attached to the same com- 
mand, but as 1,500 men — one brigade — were detached, it left 



12 EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 

the available force, with which Burnside operated, not to ex- 
ceed 8,000. 

The first division of the 9th corps was commanded by Brig. 
Gen. Ferrero, and the second by Brig, Gen. Hartranft. Five 
six gun batteries, respectively, Benjamin's, Buckley's, Get- 
ting's. Van Schlein's and Kcemer's, comprised the artillery; 
the former a battery from the first U. S. " regular " artillery, 
armed with 20 pounder "Parrots," was the special pet ol the 
corps and considered nearly invincible. 

When we had neared the river at Louden, the route 
changed to a road running parallel with the river, to the 
north, and soon the sound of musketry ahead confirmed the 
report of the approach of the enemy. 

We afterwards leai'ned that General Bragg had detached 
General Longstreet and a force of 12,000 infantry and 2,500 
cavalry from his command at Chattanooga, and that the lat- 
ter's advance, having reached the river, had thrown a poon- 
toon bridge across it and were rapidly crossing their entire 
force; with the exception of a portion of Wheeler's cavalry, 
which had been sent to seize and hold the heights south of 
Knoxville, 

It was this news that had influenced Gen, White to retreat 
towards Knoxville, where the commanding position would 
enable him to make a more successful resistance. It was this 
also, that determined Burnside to adopt the more bold meas- 
ures of moving with all possible haste to where the enemy 
were crossing, attack those who should have already crossed 
and if possible destroy them or force them into the river. 

I shall never forget the wild and dreary night that followed 
this day's march. Our brigade was bivouaced in a hollow, 
covered with heavy timber, where the wet leaves and brittle 
twigs made more noise, as we moved, than the orders that 
were given in an undertone. We were to remain here with- 
out tires and without removing our accoutrements and wait 
for further orders, Euraors were rife that we were to make a 
night attack upon the force of the enemy this side of the 



EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 13 

river, and the anticipation of the horrors, and uncertainties of 
a movement by night, added to the fury of tie storm, filled 
every one with gloomy foreboding. 

Later — permission came to build small fires and cook coffee. 
I can hardly tell how we found it possible to make fires from the 
water soaked twigs, but within ten minutes, fires had been 
started in every direction, and groups of dripping soldiers 
surrounded them, to prevent the reflection of the liglit from 
betraying the position, and to look after their respective inter- 
est in cups of water that were momentarily in danger of up- 
setting. 

I cannot qualify the reviving effects of coffee. My spirits 
rose with every swallow of the strong, hot coffee I had pre- 
pared, till I indulged in the brighter fancies of home, and I 
wondered if there really was a North were there was com- 
fort, peace and plenty ; I almost doubted it, for there was so 
great a contrast, and many years seemed to have been crowd- 
ed into the brief year and a half It was a bright, but re- 
motely distant picture, in which, I^was convinced, I had no 
part. 

About four in the morning, the order came to fall in quietly 
Those who had slept were awakened, and the ranks were 
hurriedly formed by dripping, silent forms, who rendered a 
mechanical obedience to orders. 

Upon reaching the road, we found, greatly to our surprise, 
that the troops were falling back. There was instant relief 
from the suspense, preceding what we had supposed to be an 
attack. Finding no answer to the query of why we were re- 
treating, we filed into the road and began retracing our steps. 
We afterwards learned that orders had been given to make 
a night attack, but that, but a few minutes before nine — the 
appointed time — ^a courier from Grant — at Chattanooga — had 
arrived, bringing information that he (Grant) was apprised of 
the withdrawal of Longstreet's corps from the Army under 
Bragg, and that he intended to seize the opportunity 
while they were separated and move upon the latter. Burn- 



14 EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 

side was ordered to concentrate his force at Knoxville, and no 
to allow an engagement to occur except in self-defense, or to 
prevent Longstreet from returning to re-enforce Bragg. 

Thus it became necessary for Burnside to change his tactics* 
much as he regretted the loss of an opportunity for acheiving 
a decisive victory. He has been rather severely criticised tor 
not having acted upon his conviction that he could have routed 
the enemy, and thus have terminated the campaign. It must 
be remembered that even if successful, the movement would 
hnve been contrary to orders from Grant, and that remnants 
of Longstreet's force would have I'etreated to, and re-entorced 
Bragg, which was what Grant expressly desired should not be 
allowed. Then, too, the retiring to Knoxville, fortifying and 
defending it, would involve a comparatively small loss of men 
and since Grant had assured him that re-enforcements would 
be dispatched to him at the earliest practical moment, the pos- 
sibility of accomplishing the same general results — the saving 
of loss of men, and the possibility of defeat, which would 
have fxstened upon him, personally, the responsibility of the 
disaster — each, and all, of these reasons doubtless influenced 
him in countermanding his orders and inaugurating a retreat. 

The return march, the first day, was made with little other 
opposition than that of the elements. 

The difficulties of the day's march occupied our attention 
to the exclusion even of thoughts of the dangers just escaped, 
or of those yet in store. 

In less urgent circumstances the roads would have been 
considered almost impassable, for the liberal mixture of water 
with the red clay soil had produced a substance not so slippery 
as soap, nor so sticky as wax, yet, in all respects, qualified to 
receive the appellation of Tennessee mud, and through this we 
moved, for we could not marcli, and even moving frequently 
became a matter of uncertainty. All the rain having fallen 
that the ground would hold, about noon it cleared off and 
began to blow cold from the north. 

The artillery frequently became stalled and had to be 



EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 15 

hauled out with ropes by regiments of infantry, horses would 
sink down in the mud and be unable to extricate themselves 
and a detail of some passing regiment would lift them out' 
oftener, men would have their boots spoken for, and it always 
provoked a laugh whenever a man had to fall back to recover 
his shoe which had been surreptitiously taken posession of — 
I do not wish to exaggerate the picture — I cannot truthfully 
leave out one of the features. 

The hope of rest and fire cheered the men on, and about 
the middle of the afternoon when the troops turned into a field, 
about two miles from Lenoir Station. All was forofotten in the 
preparation to enjoy every moment that should be allowed for 
rest. My partner started out in quest of wood and water, and, 
taking our gun-slings, I moved down upon two large straw 
stacks that stood near the river — my inspiration was evidently 
shared by about half the army who were concentrating upon 
that point with utmost despatch. 

One discription will do for all : The slings were hooked 
together and laid out on the ground, and as many armfuls of 
straw laid upon them as they could reach around, and the feat 
of acurately poising a very large mound of straw, above a 
a pair of comparatively small legs being accomplished, the 
whole moved off in the direction of camp. Here is solid com- 
fort, I thought, as I drew near, and not so very bad for these 
war times either. 

I shall never forget the scene spread out before me, when 
at last I extricated myself from the straw and looked back. 

The two stacks near the river had entirely vanished, or 
rather were vanishing as fast as legs could carry them, in 
every direction, and the appearance of hundreds of mounds of 
straw moving oft" without any apparant cause, was too ludi- 
crous to admit of being accurately described. But, alas, within 
an hour, marchincc orders came and our brigade moved back to 
Lenoir, where we remained till 3 p. m., when we took a position 
north of the rail road, and threw out a line ni skirmishers. At 
dusk the enemy'i skirmishers had advanced to within half amile 



16 EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 

. • 

and occasional shots were exchanged during the night, along 
the picket line. 

Another night, full of alarms and anxious watching, passed 
slowly away. The wind was piercing cold, and only one fire 
was allowed to a company, which must not be allowed to be 
so large but that it could be concealed by those who stood 
around it. 

Frequently, a tew shots, in rapid succession, on the skirmish 
line, would alai*m the main line, and the men would kick out 
the fires and form into line. After standing a few minutes 
under arras, until all was quiet again, the scattered brands 
would be collected and re-kindled, and immediately surrounded 
by the hands of those who were fortunate enough to form one 
of the circle ; those, less fortunate, would lie down on the 
ground, and pulling the capes of their great-coats about their 
heads, drop into a sleep from which they would be startled by 
a push of a foot and the hurried words *' fall in." 

At four o'clock the position was abandoned, and, soon after 
we stacked arras in sight of our old winter quarters. 

Near the station about one hundred baggage wagons were 
corralled, and as the raules were needed to move the artillery, 
it became a military necessity to destroy the train, and a 
detachment of White's division of the 23rd corps were engaged 
in cutting the spokes of the wagon wheels, cutting up or 
burning the harness, tents, officers' baggage, &c., &c.j while 
barrels of bacon, coffee, and sugar were burst open and dis- 
tributed to the men, and what they could not take was 
destroyed. Many of the men, who feared a scarcity of rations 
in the future, loaded themselves with a supply, which if they 
had not been obliged to unburden themselves of during the 
day would have gone far towards mitigating the miseries of 
the siege that followed. 

It was about six o'clock, the morning of the sixteenth of 
I^overaber, that tlie troops took up their line of retreat in the 
following order. The 79th New York (Highlanders) were 
dispatched to Knoxville as a guard with the trains, which 



EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 17 

were started in advance of the retreat, then followed Chapin's 
brigade of White's division of the 23rd corps and the second 
division of the Ninth corps under Hartranft, with orders to 
occupy and hold the hills near Campbell station. Colonel 
Clu-ist's (second) brigade of our (first) division then followed, 
with similar orders, except that they should hold themselves 
ready to aid the first and third brigades in case of necessity 
With the exception of a section * of artillery to each of our 
three brigades, all the artillery was to be as advantageously 
posted, at Campbell station, as possible, to cover the retreat 
of the infantry, should they be hard pushed when they had 
reached that point. 

The first brigade, of our division, was sent to hold the junc- 
tion of the road, where the Kingston road joined the main 
road, which was about one mile short of the station where the 
main body of the troops were stationed. It was rightly 
feared tliat Longstreet would send a column down that road 
to intercept the retreat. 

It was after seven before our brigade filed into the road and 
took up their line of retreat. First was the 20th Michigan, 
under command of Colonel Smith, next the Second Michigan, 
under Major Byington, and the Seventeenth Michigan, under 
Colonel Comstock, was chosen to perform the duties of rear 
guard. We realized, in some measure, the critical nature of 
the important task assigned us. To cover the retreat of 
an army in front of a powerful enemy coming upon us in light 
marching order, was a task not to be coveted. 

A detail of three companies from our regiment, " E," '•' K," 
and "G," was made for skirmishers, with Major F. W. Swift 
in command ; companies " F " and " G " at first acting as 
" reserve," while company " K " deployed to the right and 
left of the road. Orders were given for the regiment to keep 
within a quarter of a mile of the rest of the brigade, for the 
reserve to allow one hundred yards between themselves and 

* Two pieces of cannon. 
3 



18 EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN, 

the regiment, and the deployed line of skirmishers to keep 
within fifty yards of the reserve, and to "preserve distances." 

We had not gone in this order, more than three quarters of 
a mile, betore reports of rifles were heard, and soon alter, 
the detachment of the 23d corps, who were left to complete 
the destruction of the train, came up in hasty retreat and re- 
ported that the enemy had comj^elled them to abandon their 
work. 

Notwithstanding the approach of the enemy, many of the 
min ol our division seemed utterly unconscious of their personal 
danger, and we frequently came up with stragglers, who were 
sitting by the side of the road, to rest, and only the sight of 
the confederate skirmishers, who were following, half a mile 
distant, would make them move on. 

One old cook, who was loaded down with the spoils from 
the wagon train, was resting near the road, and when told 
that he had better " limber up " and move to the rear if he 
didn't want to be captured, he said, "you can't fool me, I'm 
not afraid ; Zam an old soldier." We left him sitting there, 
smoking, with a look of quiet satisfaction on his face, which 
considering the circumsatnces, was made more ludicrous, by 
the weight of the meat and conceit he carried. 

Company " K " was then relieved by Company " E," who 
deployed to the right and left of the road, guiding on the 
center. There were but twenty-one men in our company, at the 
time, including non-commissioned officers, and the men deploy- 
ing at intervals of about ten feet, made a line of about two 
hundred feet in length. 

Soon a shot was heard, almost immediately accompanied 
by a clatter of brogans, and our old friend, the cook, came 
bearing down upon us, the perfect picture of fright. There 
was no fatigue noticeable about his gait, and he made 
excellent time till he was out of sight ; his camp-kettles and 
pans clashing at every jump. It has been said, a "fool can 
take an array into a fight, but it takes a general to withdraw 
them." I am sure that nothing but the great experience he 



EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 1 9 

possessed enabled him to make so masterly a withdrawal ot 
his "forces" in the presence of the enemy; in point of celerity 
and success I have never seen it equaled. 

When within a mile-and-a-half of the junction of the I'oads 
we were compelled to halt for some time to allow the troops 
to cross a creek, where they were necessarily delayed, and the 
enemy's skirmish line advanced to witliin rifle range and halted, 
while we could plainly see them iiurrying up troops from the 
rear and forming a line of battle not far in the rear of their 
skirmish line. Their lines extended nearly across an open 
field, 400 yards wide, and just as we resumed our retreat they 
commenced advancing. 

Just as General Ferrero, who commanded our division, was 
sitting down to dinner at a house a mile back, (we were 
examining our cartridges and the priming of our rifles), and 
just as the first shot came whistling through the trees, a 
little too high for the head of one of our company, the General 
arose from his table, with the remark, " Gentlemen, the ball is 
opened." 

Companies " G " and '* K " were instantly deployed to the 
right and left of company "E" — and the men, securing the 
protection of trees and stumps, opened a fire that checked the 
advance of their skirmish line, and their main line hastened 
up to their support. Had the smallest fraction of the volleys 
then poured in, been accurately delivered, our handful of men 
must have been swept away, for the sound of the bullets 
striking the trees, mostly over our heads, was like hail on a 
roof; but a comparatively small proportion of bullets were 
aimed low enough to do execution. 

Almost at the first fire, one of our boys was struck on the 
side of the head, and, throwing his rifle forward, fell on his 
face — dead. Soon after, another had an arm broken, and 
started to the rear, holding up his bleeding arm with his hand, 
and another, wounded in the leg, while attempting to crawl 
away on his hands and knees, was struck in the head, and fell 
in the passage, between a log and stump, through whicii he 
was passing. 



20 EAST TEKNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 

Men were beginning to drop, here and there, in the other 
companies, and the enemy having started columns of men on 
either flank to cut us ofi", it became necessary for the skirmish 
line to abandon their position. 

Not greater is the masterly manipulation of an army by an 
experienced general, than the control of a soldier's mind amid 
the awful and uncertain surroundings of a battle field. While 
he has an ear to orders, and quick hands and feet to execute* 
and eyes that comprehend the terrible reality of the situation, 
his thoughts fly, quick messengers, from the present to the 
past, and from the past to the future. Every picture brought 
up is clearly defined, the judgments of conscience upon them 
are undisputed, and the resolutions for the future, if spared, or 
the hope of mercy, if called, are made and craved with an 
earnestness that, for the time at least, is sincere. 

But so deep are his convictions, so real the actual presence 
of death, that sooner than be hurried into the presence of his 
Maker unprepared, almost are his honor and remembrance of 
his loved ones at home forgotten. 

So great is the activity of his mind, that the thought-labor 
of a year is performed in an hour, and so great is the exercise, 
that he wipes the perspiration ofi" his face, on that cold 
November day, with his powder-blackened hand. 

The story of a battle can never be told in words, it dwells 
only in the remembrance of experience. 

When Major Swift gave orders for the line to fall back to 
the regiment and take their position as companies in the 
regiment, nearly every man, knowing the nature of the work 
before him, threw ofi" his heavy knapsack, and, unencum. 
bered, soon rejoined the command. 

When we reached the regiment Ave found the men in con- 
siderable confusion. The nearly fatal mistake of attempting 
to form the regiment in the bottom of a ravine, with the water 
and high bank behind us, did not tend to restore order. The 
enemy had entered the ravine both above and below us, and 
were pouring in an enfilading fire, which, with the fire from in 



EA.ST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 21 

front, was doing execution in our ranks. Two color-bearers 
liad been woundad, and the men were beginning to fall here 
and there, while the position was not one that would admit 
of our returning a shot. Soon the men began to break from 
the ranks and start to the rear; first it was by one and twos; 
soon it was little short of a rout. The Colonel and some of 
the line officers did their utmost to check the })anic. Ca})tain 
Tyler showed a bleeding arm to the men and implored them 
not to run. Colonel Comstock called on them to remember 
" South Mountain," where the regiment had earned so fair a 
reputation, and displayed the utmost bravery, but to no 
purpose. The men would not remain in the bed of the ravine; 
and with/the exception of the killed and wounded, and a tew 
who took the pi'otection of an old wooden distillery and 
opened a well-directed fire on the enemy in the ravine, above 
and below, the men forded the creek and scaled the bank 
beyond, regardless of orders. There had never been a time 
when our!: regiment was so near disgrace, nor when quick, 
efficient measures were so needed. 

We ever afterwards had cause to remember, with gratitude, 
the timely service of our Major, F. W. Swift. Seeing the 
colors fall with the third color-bearer, he took them, and 
calling to the men, said, " We have fallen back just far 
enough ; we will form here." Some one asked, " Who shall 
we form on." He replied, '"''Form onme!^'' If ever words were 
"fitly spoken," they were spoken then. It was a critical 
moment, but happily the retreat was arrested, and the men, 
rapidly forming in order, were able, with a rapid, well- 
delivered fire, to check the advance of the enemy, who had 
crossed the ravine, and now came up, with cheers, on a charge. 
A return charge was made, with the utmost enthusiasm, by 
our regiment; and whether it was the surprise, or the belief 
by the enemy, that we had received reinforcements, I know 
not, but their charge was turned into a precipitate retreat; 
and we resumed our retreat slowly and in good order.* 

♦ From Sergeant Morgan Dowling, who was captured at the old distillery, I learn 



22 EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 

Suddenly the welcome sound of a cannon was heard ; and 
while the shot was rushing over our heads, another followed, 
and, a moment latei", we came within sight of the rest of the 
brigade, drawn up on the crest of a slight eminence just 
beyond. 

We were greeted with cheers by the Second and Twentieth, 
and forming on the left of the brigade, and the artillery " lim- 
bering up," and starting in advance, the brigade began to fall 
back. 

The enemy, having re-formed, came up with a line which 
had been largely i-einforced by fresh troops, and when within 
range, advanced, with cheers, on- a charge. A rail fence hap- 
jDening to be situated parallel to our line, and but a few rods 
in the rear, we soon reached it and dropping behind it, and 
resting our rifles on the rails waited till their line came 
within short range, when a volley threw them into con- 
fusion, and before it could be re-formed a second volley 
scattered and drove them back. 

A stubborn resistance was made to every succeeding at- 
tack, the brigade employing every interval in retiring as 
fast as possible. The brigade commander — Col. Wm. Hum- 
phrey — mounted on a snow white horse, and forming a most 
conspicuous mark, seemed omnipresent at all points along 
the brigade line, and added, by his presence, not a little to 
the steadiness of the troops. 

In one of the attacks, Col. Smith, of the T^ventieth Michi- 
gan, was killed at his post, at the head of his regiment. It is 
to be regretted that he was not spared to enjoy the reputation, 
won that day, under his guidance, by his regiment. 

Heavy volleys of musketry were heard in the direction of 

that our charge produced a wonderful res?ult. Their men running back in a perfect 
panic, did not stop till they had re-crossed the creek ; and that, just previous to our 
charge, General Longstreet came to the further bank of ttie creek, and, alighting, 
began questioning the prisoners, who had been taken at the old distillery, ia regard to 
our numbers and position. While he was talking, our charge was made, and as his 
men came running back in conlusion, he turned his attention to his troops, giving 
orders to the reserve to move up rapidly, and sending brigades to either side of those 
in our front, to operate on our Hanks. A moment after he mounted to ride away, the 
first shot from* our caauou struck on the exact place where he had been standing. 



EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 23 

the Kingston road, and it was evident that Morrison's brigade 
were engaging the troops Longstreet had sent to intercept 
lis. However sanguine the enemy were of accomplishing tliat 
plan when it was designed, it was soon proven to be a diiii- 
cult one to demonstrate, for the old first brigade " didn't drive 
worth a cent," and proved to be a sufiicient barrier till we 
had passed the junction, when they too fell back and united. 
We soon gained the cover of the artillery at Campbell. 
station.* 

Thus far, only the first and third brigade ot our division 
had been engaged. The former, fortunately, having been 
under fire but a few minutes^ suffered but a slight loss. In 
our brigade the loss was more severe. Our regiment lost about 
60 and the 2d and 20th Michigan about 35 each. 

On either side of the village of Campbell station, were 

♦From an account publisihed in 1805, bv the Major of the Thirty-sixth Massachu- 
eetts, one of Morrison's briuade, the following extract is taken : 

" Near the junction of thu roads, we advanced into an open field, and at once 
formed our line of battle in rear of a rail fence. The Eighth Michigan was on our left 
and the Foriy-flfth Pennsylvania was deployed as skirmishers. The rest of our 
troops were now withdrawing to a new position, back of the village of Campbell 
station ; and we were left to cover the movement. 

" Unfurling our colors, we awaited the advance of the enemy. 

" There was an occasional shot tired in our front, and to our right ; but it was soon 
evident that the rebels were moving to our left in order to gain the cover of the 
woods, 

" Moving off by the left flank, therefore, we took a second position in an adjoin- 
ing field. 

"Finding now the enemy moving rapidly through the woods, and threatening our 
rear, we executed a left half wheel, and advancing on the double quick to the rail 
fence, which ran along the ed^e of the woods, we opened a heavy fire. 

" From this position the enemy endeavored to force us. 

" His fire was well directed, but the fence afforded us a slight protection. 

" For a while we held the enemy in check, but at length the skirmishers of the 
Forty-fifth Pennsylvania, who were watching our right discovered a body of rebel 
infantry pushing towards our rear from the KinL'Ston road. 

" Colonel Morrison, our brigade commander, at once ordered the Thirty-sixth 
Massachusetts and Eighth Michigan to face about, and establish a new line in rear 
of the rail fence, on the opposite side of the field. 

" We advanced on the double quick, and reaching the fence, our men, with a shout, 
poured a volley into the rebel line of battle, which not only checked its advance, but 
drove it back in confusion. 

" Meanwhile the enemy in 'jur rear moved up to the edge of the woods, which we 
had just lelt, and now opined a bril^k fire. 

" We at once crossed the fence in order to place it between us and his fire, and 
were about to devote our attention again to him, when orders came for us to with- 
draw, it being no longer necessary to hold the junction of the roads, for all our 
troops and wagons had now passed." 



24 EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 

low ranges of hills on which the artillery was posted, and be- 
tween these the infantry was placed, with Hartranft's division 
on the left. White's division of the 23d corps, in the centei', 
and Ferrero's division on the right. The whole field for a 
half mile back was open to view, and about noon, three lines 
of Confederate troops emerged from the woods and advanced 
rapidly to the attack. Their heavy and well " dressed " ranks, 
with their colors flying, formed an imposing spectacle. No 
sooner were they fairly in view than our batteries opened on 
them first with shot and shell, then their line " closing up " 
and continuing to advance, with cannister. No troops could 
stand it, and they fell back to the woods in the greatest con- 
fusion. 

Soon the enemy's artillery began firing, at first wildly, soon 
with considerable precision, and was directed against the in- 
fantry of our division. All our guns were turned on the 
their batteries and the hills trembled under the reverberation. 
Soon we discovered a heavy column of the enemy advancing, 
under cover of the smoke, upon our right. The second brig- 
ade of our division immediately changed front, and a portion 
of the artillery turning and throwing double charges of can- 
nister at short range, checked their progress, and they re- 
treated to the voods. Almost immediately an attempt was 
made to turn our left, the enemy coming up evidently to 
strike Hartranft's left and rear. Again the " war dogs " were 
let loose and the enemy's broken ranks sought the shelter of 
the woods. 

Longstreet must have suffered a terrible loss, for nothing 
short of punishment would have checked bis veteran ''troops. 

Seldom during the war, had there been given so unob- 
structed a view of the whole field, as spread itself out before 
our position. During the enemy's advance, the execution 
of our artillery was attested by hundreds who saw great gaps 
made in their ranks by our firing ; they would immediately 
"close up" and advance — the artillery at every discharge 
making fearful havoc among them — till finally they would 



EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 25 

break, and the route back to tlie woods was in every respect a 
rout. 

There was a faschuition, in watching the artillery, that I 
could not resist, each gun seemed like a living, moving evil 
spirit, surrounded with a halo of sulphorous smoke. At the 
time of the assault, the scenes shifted as constantly as the views 
in a kaloidascope, and at each shift the gunners and their 
" spirits " assumed new tableaux. Near one of the batteries 
when the wind would lift the smoke a little, we could distin- 
guish a pair of boots that resembled Burnside's boots ; and 
judging from an occasional glimpse of an old soft felt hat, 
which seemed to be nearly above them, we knew that some- 
where between, our commander had his headquarters estab- 
lished. 

Under cover of the first shades of night, the troops began 
falling back. Seventeen long, muddy miles lay between us 
and Knoxville, unlighted by anything save an occasional star 
that looked through some rift in the clouds that were traveling 
on and over us toward Knoxville — seventeen of the longest, 
weariest miles that it has ever been my misfortune to travel. 

Seventeen will not begin to number the times I went to 
sleep while walking, nor the times I wished for nothing better 
than the privilege of lying down beside the road for a few 
minutes' sleep. 

So successfully was this movement executed, that it was 
not till morning revealed our absence, that Longstreet received 
his first intimation of our withdrawal. 

Col. O. M. Poe had preceded us two days, having left us at 
Lenoir, by General Burnside's order, and by dint of uninter- 
rupted labor, had completed designs for defenses. The four 
original earthworks were " pressed into the service," without 
any very great remodeling, for although they had been con- 
structed for an entirely different purpose, and were necessarily 
illy adapted to the contingences of a siege, the demand for 
immediate defenses was far too great, and the time allowed 
too limited to think of constructing others in their places 
4 



26 EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 

which should conform in every respect to mles for construct- 
ing siege defenses. Favorable intermediate positions were 
selected for twelve addition^il forts and batteries, and it was 
rightly conjectured that when our artillery should occupy 
them, and the infantry had constructed connecting lines of 
breastworks, the position would be an unusually secure one. 
The morning of the 17th of November, as the troops came in 
they were assioned positions by Col. O. M. Poe. The first 
division of the Ninth Corps occupied the line to the west of 
the city, from the Plolston north to the earthwork — after- 
wards known as Fort Sanders — thence east to " Second 
Creek," which coming down from the north forms the western 
boundary to the city. The second division held the line from 
there to Temperance Hill, which was a considerable eminence 
immediately east of " First Creek," running parallel to Second 
Creek, and forming the eastern boundary to the city. The 
remaining line, running still iurther to the east, to Ma^ery's 
Hill, and thence south to the river, was held by the portion of 
the Twenty third Corps. Benjamin's and Buckley's batteries 
were assigned to Fort Sanders, and Roemer's battery occupied 
an earthwork half way between the Fort and the river, known 
as " Battery Noble," and another, thrown up in front of the 
State University, which occupied a commanding position in 
the rear of Battery Noble, and overlooked it, and was known 
as " College " or " University Hill " battery, but afterwards 
christened " Fort Byington." Two guns garrisoned the 
former, and the remaining four the latter. East of Fort San- 
ders, at unequal distances, were the earthworks, afterward 
known as Batteries " Zoellner" and " Galpin," and " Fort 
Comstock." Next east " Battery Wiltsee " formed the most 
northern one of the four works already constructed ; east of 
this " Battery Billingsby " foimed the last fortification to the 
west of First Creek, while east of First Creek, upon *' Tem- 
perance Hill," was "Fort Smith " and two batteries — "Lee" 
and "Stearman." "Fort Hill," situated on Mabery's Hill, 
was the fourth original earthwork, and formed the most cast- 



EA.ST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 27 

crn portion of our defenses. Along this line of defenses the 
remaining artillery of the Ninth Coi'ps was stationed, while 
" Battery Fearns," near the river, on ihe east, and earthworks 
on the bluffs to the south of the river — afterward known as 
" Fort Stanley," and batteries " Dickerson " and " Iligley " — 
were garrisoned by the artillery of the Twenty-third Corps.* 
A requisition for laborers had been made upon the citizens 
of the town and work on the defenses had been begun while 
the army were still holding the position at Campbell station, 
the sound of the cannonading giving an impetus to their 
labor ; the work, however, was little more than begun when 
the troops returned and took their position along the lines. 
Notwithstanding the fatigue resulting from marching and fight- 
ing, the men were able to appreciate the remarks of General 
Ferrero, when he rode up to where Colonel Comstock was 
standing and said, " tell your men, Colonel, that they will have 
to hold this i^osition" — pointing to a row of stakes where 
bi-eastworks were to be thrown up — "or go to Libby Prison." 
Two hours were given for rest, and were instantly appropriated, 
the men lying down wherever they were standing. General 
Burnside's headquarters were established at a large brick house 
in the city, on " Gay " street, known as the " Crozier House," 
and just as the troops were lying down to rest, the General 
sent a request to General Sanders and Colonel Poe, to report 
to him for consultation ; of the latter, he inquired, " how lono' 
will it be before the rifle pits will be so far completed that 
they can be used as defenses ?" " To-day noon," was the reply. 
Turning to General Sanders, he asked, "can you hold Lono-- 
street till that time ?" On receiving a positive "yes" in reply, 

*On our division line, tlie first brigade held the left, their left resting on the river and 
their right on Fort Sanders. The third brigade garrisoned the fort, and held the line 
towards the east for about 800 yards, and the second brigade occupied the right, with 
its right exteiidiug to Battery Galpiu. In our brigade, the Seventy-ninth >ew York 
held the left, garrisoning the fort. First to the east was the Second Michigan, next the 
Twentieth Michigan, and last, and holding the right, the Seventeenth Michigan. It 
was not till after the siege that any of tliese forts and batteries were named. By a 
general order General Burnside gave them the names of officers who had been killed 
at the battle of Campbell station, and the sie^e of Knozvilie 



28 EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 

the conversation turned upon the number and condition of the 
troops composing the brigade, which General Sanders said 
were " 700 strong, and in good fighting trim." 

While Sander's cavalry — which had been previously hold- 
ing the town — were going out to retard the advance of Long- 
street, the troops were enjoying utter unconsciousness of every- 
thing about them, and nothing, no tnaiter hoio tempting, could 
have purchased the immediate possession of those two hours 
of sleep. The sun rose just as those two shortest yet most 
satisfactory hours of my life had expired, and preparation 
was made to complete the earthworks. The work of throwing 
up redoubts and breastworks was prosecuted with all possible 
despatch ; there was a scarcity of entrenching tools, but every 
axe, pick and spade was ke])t in constant requisition by willing 
workers, who worked to the time of brisk skirmish firing be- 
tween the enemy's advance and our cavalry. 

Knowing that a single brigade of cavalry could not long 
prove a vei y serious barrier to Longstreet's force, we expected 
every moment to be obliged to throw down our tools and take 
lip our rifles, hence, our first desire was only to effect a tem- 
porary protection, and the trenches were of the most simple 
character, made by digging a ditch four feet wide and as many 
deep, throwing the earth excavated on the outside, making an 
embankment which was about shoulder high when we were 
standing in the trenches. 

During the afternoon of the 18th, there was considerable 
skirmishing between the dismounted cavalry under General 
Sanders and Longstreet's advance ; the former, protected by 
rail fences, received and repulsed several charges of the enemy. 
Later in the day batteries were brought up, and opening a 
heavy fire, our troops were obliged to fall back. It was at 
this time that General Sanders was mortally wounded and 
was carried back into Knoxville, where, next day, he expired. 
Colonel E. P. Alexander, who at this time was Cliief of Artil- 
lery and Chief Engineer on Longstreet's Staff, refers to him 
in a letter which I have, dated October 18, 1870. He says: 



EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 29 

" Poor Sanders was a warm personal friend. I parted with 
him in San Francisco, in May, 1861. when, on my way home. 
He accompanied me on board the steamer. I suppose I next 
saw liim, but I did not recognize him, on the afternoon he 
was killed, when I fought his command with two of my bat- 
teries and some South Carolina troops, charging a rail breast- 
works they held." 

The enemy then proceeded to besiege the place, establish- 
ing lines parallel with ours within cannon range, throwing 
up redoubts for their batteries, which on the third day of the 
siege engaged our batteries in a lively artillery duel. 

Their main force lay to the west and north of us while their 
cavalry scouted to the east, and prevented our sending out 
foraging parties in that direction. On the south of the river 
we held almost undisputed possession, and most of the sup- 
plies used during the siege were drawn from the country on 
that side. The cavalry that Longstreet had despatched, 
when he first crossed above Louden, to seize and hold the 
bluffs, had been foiled in their attempt, and had returned to 
the north side of the river. 

When Sander's cavalry had retired within the fortifications, 
part ol them were assigned positions in support of the bat- 
teries to the east and south of the city, while a portion were 
held as a general reserve to be moved to any threatened 
point. 

In front of our entire line, and parallel to it, at a distance of 
from 800 to J, 000 yards, we established a line of skirmish pits, 
dug at intervals of 30 feet, each being large enough to pro- 
tect two men. 

The morning of the 19th revealed a parallel line of the 
enemy's skirmish pits, within short range, which had been 
thrown up during the night. 

Thereafter during the siege there could be no communica- 
tion between our main line and the skirmish jjits during the 
day time. The regular "relief" went around at 9 p. m., and 
the meu posted at that time remained on duty 24 hours. 



30 EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 

The loss of the Seventeenth Michigan at Campbell station, 
with the few that sickness and fatigue had rendered unfit for 
duty, left our regiment with not more than three hundred 
men, the daily detail for skirmishers was about ninety men, 
thus bringing us on duty nearly every third day, while, on 
the days we were off skirmish duty, large details were fre- 
quently made of men to work on the forts and batteries, and 
what time remained was employed in sleeping or strengthen^ 
ing our breastworks. 

Directly west of Fort Sanders, and within the enemy's 
skirmish line, thei'e stood a large brick house, which, with 
two log barns near it, served as a cover for the enemy's sharp- 
shooters, who were thus enabled to keep up an annoying fire 
upon our men in the fort. 

It was finally considered necessary to burn the buildings, 
and our regiment was selected for that purpose. Five men 
volunteered for " burners," who were placed under the direc- 
tion of Major F. W. Swift, and were equipped with axes, port 
fire, cotton, turpentine and matches. At 9 o'clock the even- 
ing of the 20th, the regiment was withdrawn from their posi- 
tion, and passing to the rear and left of the fort, and scaling 
the breastworks to the right of the Thirty-sixth Massachu- 
setts, were advanced to the skirmish line, and after stopping 
a few minutes to re-form, the men began a cautious advance. 

When within a hundred yards of the enemy's skirmish line, 
their men discovei'ed our advance, and opened fire — our signal 
for a charge. Our Colonel gave orders in a loud voice, as if 
commanding a brigade, and with cheers, which were full 
loud enough to convey such an impression to the Confederate 
skirmisliers, the line advanced on a run. Their men fled 
with very little ceremony, and our regiment, advancing be- 
yond the houses and halting, the burners took possession of 
the buildings. 

The brick house had evidently been used as headquarters 
of the picket reserve. One of the burners, while opening the 
door had a Confederate soldier dodtre out under his arm. There 



EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 31 

were evidences of the hasty retreat of tlie other inmates in an 
overturned chair and an officer's sword hanging on a nail in 
the parlor. In two of the corners of the room, blankets were 
spread out, which had evidently been occupied but a moment 
before ; these with a baking-kettle full of warm biscuits, 
which was standing on the fire-place hearth, showed how per- 
fect had been the surprise, and how precipitate their retreat. 
It was the work of but a moment to fire the house, but at 
first it seemed an almost hopeless task to set fire to the barns. 
Chairs and tables were brought from the house and broken 
up into kindling, still the logs, being damp, did not readily 
take fire. The house, howevei', was soon all ablaze, and 
thinking the work had been completed the regiment began 
retreating. Seeing that without support the barns could not 
be effectually fired, word was sent to the regiment^ which was 
about faced at once, but mistaking the order to advance to 
the former position for one to begin firing, a heavy fire was 
opened, which for a time placed the lives of the burners in the 
greatest danger from our own bullets. The mistake lasted 
for a few moments however, and not long after the former 
position was regained. The buildings having been effectually 
fired, a retreat was ordered. The enemy had evidently been 
totally deceived, and it was not till the light from the build- 
ings revealed to them our two hundred men full half way 
back to our lines, that they learned that the anticipated 
attack was instead a successful sortie. A furious cannonade 
was at once opened from their batteries, and the surprise was 
transfered from them to us, for it will always remain a matter 
of surprise to me that but two of our men were killed. 
Stopping in the pits of the first brigade, till the light of the 
burning buildings should die down, the meuj with few excep- 
tions, were engaged watching the fire, and repeating to each 
other the incidents of the evening. Those feio exceptions 
were engaged in making a scientific reconnoisance of the 
Major's pockets, from which a suspicious warmth was 
radiating. Alas, such are the chances of war, he had to sur- 



82 EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIUN". 

render. He said " I never felt so bad in my life as when I 
saw those biscuits in danger of burning." During the entire 
war there was not probably a more hazardous undertaking 
successfully executed than that evening's work. The next 
morning, General Burnside issued a general order, compli- 
menting our regiment. 

On the 21st and 22nd of November, there were indications 
of a movement being made within the enemy's lines, and every 
possible precaution was taken along our lines to guard against 
surprise. Nothing unusual occured, however, except that, 
on the morning of the 22nd, a rifle-pit, about eighty feet long, 
was discovered to have been thrown up in front of the Con- 
federate skirmish-line, to the north of Fort Sanders. 

It was determined to drive them away from this pit, and 
fill it up, which unenviable task was assigned to the 2nd 
Michigan. Eai'ly on the morning of the 24th, one hundred 
and ninety-seven men — all who were on duty of that regiment 
— advanced out to their skirmish-line, and, waiting till the 
signal was given, advanced rapidly on the Confederate rifle-pit. 
Their entire skirmish-line, at that point, opened a steady fire 
upon our men, who, notwithstanding they were losing heavily, 
pressed forward, and actually succeeded in driving the occu- 
pants from the pit, and partially filling it up. The enemy's 
reserve coming up, however, and opening a rapid fire, our 
men were compelled to retire. An affection had always 
existed between the 2nd and IVth, and when, as the survivors 
of the former began coming in one by one, each telling: the 
same story, which confirmed our worst fears, ui iversal indig- 
nation expressed itself, in no measured terms, upon the man, 
whoever he was, who was responsible for the butchery, as it 
was appropriately termed. Sixty-nine out of the one hundred 
and ninety-seven had been lost, including Major Byington, 
who, commanding the regiment, was reported mortally 
wounded, and left on tlie field. Writing an addition to a 
journal-letter next day, I said, " A great many of the dead 
were left in the enemy's hands; one man, lying in plain 



EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 33 

sisjjht, I can see witli a glass, has li nl his clothes taken off. 
Some of the wounded, after having biid between the lines all 
day, crawled in during tlie night; one of them had had his 
shoes and stockings taken otf and tlie contents of his pockets 
removed by the rebels, wlio supposed him to be dead." 

The evening of that day the skirmishers of the 2nd brigade, 
who held a position just beyond the machine-shops belonging 
to the railroad, were attacked and driven in. Acting npon 
orders, the buildings, above twenty in number, were fired, to 
prevent their being used by the enemy's sharpshooters. An 
old brick store, which had formerly been a Confederate arsenal, 
burned with the rest ; it contained a large quantity of ammu- 
nition, of sizes which did not fit our guns, but which made 
excellent fireworks. The sound of exploding shells resembled 
heavy cannonading ; add to that the snapping and crackling 
of the flames as they climbed up the sides of the buildings, 
catching hold of each window and opening them as they went, 
together Avith the noise of falling timbers and an occasional 
crash as some roof fell in, and but a rude description is given 
of a scene that was looked at, nearly all night, by two hostile 
armies. We afterwards learned that the light of the burning 
buildings defeated a plan of the enemy, who intended to assault 
thi.t part of our line. The skirmishers re-occupied their line 
iu the morning without opposition. 

During the night ot the 24th, the enemy threw a pontoon 
bridge across the Holston, below their line, and having 
crossed a considerable body of troops, on the morning of the 
25th, an unsuccessful attempt was made to occupy the heights 
to the south of the river; failing in that attempt, they finally 
succeeded in planting a battery upon a knob, two thousand 
three hundred yards down the river, from which an enfilading 
fire was opened at Fort Sanders. Their skirmishers were 
more than ordinarily active, also, and men who were standing 
within our main line were frequently fired at ; an orderly with 
dispatches, riding up to our Colonel's head-quarters, was shot 
through the heart, and, an hour later, while a group of our 
5 



34 EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAiaN. 

officers were holding a consdltation, the Colonel received a 
mortal wound in his side. 

Notwithstanding the next day was our national thanks- 
giving day, the death of Colonel Comstock cast a gloom over 
the regiment that not even General Burnside's cheerful general 
order in regard to observing the day, could entirely remove. 
Only a small detail of men could be spared to form the funeral 
escort, and this last service, that we were allowed to perform 
for one we had loved, was soon completed. 

The 26th of November was a cold fall day, and the loss of 
our blankets and extra clothing at Campbell station, rendered 
us illy prepared to endure exposure. Very few of our Com- 
pany had either overcoats or blankets, for these, together with 
our tents were in the knapsacks we had thrown off, at the 
beginning of that engagement. In lieu of tents, we dug 
holes in the bank, back of the trenches, and when off duty, 
two of us would crawl in, and the warmth of each other's 
bodies was the only covering. 

I recall a characteristic scene towards the close of that day 
when tAvo soldiers were hovering over a fire of twigs they had 
built in the bottom of the trench, the wind frequently blowing 
the smoke in their faces, notwithstanding their attempts to 
ward it off with their hands. They were talking of thanks- 
giving at home, and recounting the savory dinners they had 
thoughtlessly eaten, with thankless hearts, in times past, and 
were wondering what their people at home were doing, and 
whether they were remembered. An occasional shot from 
some misguided " Greyback " passing overhead, attracted 
less attention than the evolutions of sundry squads of 
domestic "Greybacks" that were endeavoring to gain strat- 
egic positions under those soldiers' blouses, and frequent 
appropriate gestures, that were needed to round off and add 
grace to some sentence in the conversation, were suddenly 
arrested and used to intercept some hostile movement. 

From the first, the question of rations was the most difficult 
one to answer of any of the knotty problems that the seige 
propounded. When the place was first invested we had but 



EA.ST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN 35 

two days' rations on hand. The mills were taken possession of, 
and the citizens were required to contribute from their supplies. 
Only quaiter rations were issued from the first, and the offi- 
cers fared but little better than the men. The supply of coffee 
and sugar was exhausted in three or four days, and thereafter 
during the seige only a small piece of bread, (made from a mix- 
ture of flour, meal and bran,) together with an occasional 
piece of fresh pork, were issued for each twenty-four hours' 
supply. 

Later in the siege, corn on the cob was issued two or three 
times, as a substitute for the bread, and was eaten by many 
without even waiting to roast it. We frequently ate our day's 
allowance at once, and with undiminished appetite, Avaited 
twenty-four hours for the next day's rations. Sometimes we 
divided the allowance into three parts, and although they were 
each scarcely more than mouthfuls, we imagined that they 
better satisfied our constantly increasing hunger. 

Foraging parties that were sent south of the river secured 
considerable quantities of corn and wheat, which, with supplies 
that were floated down the river on rafts by loyal Tennes- 
seeans, helped to prolong our capacity for endurance. The 
enemy soon discovered the latter plan and cut off any further 
hope in that direction. 

Hearing that the enemy were building a huge raft of logs 
to float against our pontoon bridge, and carry away our only 
avenue of communication with the country to the south, an 
iron cable was constructed and stretched across the river above 
the bridge, and a boom of logs, fastened end to end, still 
further up the river. 

We afterwards learned that although it was meditated, no 
raft was ever constructed. 

From the first. Fort Sanders had been considered to be the 
key to our position, and details of men had been at work upon 
it each night, and it had been very materially strengthened. 
Cotton bales had been brought from the town and placed 
upon the parapet, and covered with wet hides to prevent the 



36 EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 

guns setting them on fire ; cannon had been placed to the 
right of the angle to rake the ditch in front of the fort, which 
ditch was from eight to ten feet deep and about ten feet wide. 
These, with wire which had been stretched from stump to 
stump on the slope m front of the fort, rendered the defenses 
such, that a successful attack at that point was thought im- 
probable.* 

During the night of the 27th, there was a great deal of 
ch<-ering along the enemy's lines, and their bands entertained us 
with a variety of music. They were evidently in receipt of 
good news or reinforcements. Late in the afternoon of the 
next day. movements of troops and chopping of trees in the 
woods in front of the fort were distinctly heard by our 
skirmishers, and reported by Capt. Delos Phillips, who had 
command of the skirmish line, to General Ferrero, The trees 
in front of the enemy's battery on the south side of the rivei*, 
were also cleared away, making it evident that some move- 
ment was pending, to be directed, possibly, against the fort. 
That night, a larger detail than usual was made for skir- 
mishers, and the troops that remained on the main line were 
more than ordinarily watchful. Coming in from a twenty- 
four hours' fast on the skirmish line, I had just received and 
eaten my next days' allowance, when suddenly heavy mus- 
ketry along our entire division-front made it evident that our 
skirmish line had been attacked, A few of our men coming 
in, reported that the line had been taken, and most of our men 
were prisoners. A fresh detail was at once made, and, 
advancing about half-way to our old line, a new line was 
established, and by working nearly all night, new pits were 
thrown up. The first light of morning, on the 29th of Novem- 
ber, revealed the fact that our old line was occupied by the 
enemy's skirmishers. Diiring the night, the 79th New York 
had erected a fine flagstaff in the fort, and, the division band 
having come up, just as the sun was rising, the '' stars and 

* The armament of the fort consisted of fotir twenty-pound Parrotts, four light 
twelve-pounders, and two three-inch s?teel rifles ; a few yards to the south, a redoubt 
with two of Buckley's twelve-pounders, covered the left angle. 



EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 37 

stripes glided up into i\m sun-liglit to the magical strains of 
the ' Star-spangled Banner.' " This air, always inspiring, 
seemed never so appropriate before, and, in cheer after cheer, 
we gave almost invohmtary response to the feeling of joy it 
provoked, wliile the flag, spreading itself out on the breeze, 
waved a defiance to the enemy. Suddenly, the enemy opened 
a furious cannonade on Fort Sanders from their batteries, 
which were posted at distances varying from seven hundred 
to one thousand five hundred yards: on the west, one battery 
of six twelve-pounders, and another of twenty-pound Parrotts ; 
on the north, one battery of twenty-pound Parrotts and two 
three-inch rifles, and two batteries of two guns each ; across 
the Holston, one battery of six guns. Occasionally, a shell 
from their battery, going over the fort and our skirmish line 
burst in their own line in our front. We were short of am- 
munition, and our batteries reserved their fire for the threatened 
attack, and the infantry in the fort and to each side silently 
awaited the result. In about twenty minutes their fire slack- 
ened, and, instead, the well-known yell rang out, as three 
masses of the enemy's troops were seen coming up the slope 
towards the north-west angle of the fort. Notwithstanding 
the wire entanglements, which for a time threw their line into 
the greatest confusion, the cannister from the guns of the fort, 
and the infantry fire of portions of the 1st and 3rd brigades, 
their men gained the ditch, when, leaping in, they attempted 
to scale the opposite side and the parapet of the fort. The 
weight of the enemy's columns pressed those in front on into 
the ditch, until it was nearly filled by a mass of men who were 
vainly essaying to either scale the fort or protect themselves 
from the raking fire of our cannon. Such was the desperate- 
ness of the assault that a number of the enemy succeeded in 
climbing the embankment, and demanded the surrender of the 
fort, but were instantly shot or captured ; the battle-flags of 
the 13th and IVth Mississippi and the 16th Georgia were 
planted on the parapet, but fell into our hands ; the latter was 
carried by an officer, who, stepping in the embrazure in front 
of a cannon, laid his hand on the muzzle of the gun, and called 



38 EA.ST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 

out to the crunners to surrender ; the o:un was discharged, and 
the man was blown to atoms, liis fliaa: falling into the fort. 
One of our men mounted the parapet with an axe and drove 
back some who were crawling up, while Lieut. Benjamin took 
shells in his hand, and lighting the fuse, tossed them over into 
the ditch tp " still them down." * 

Not twenty minutes had passed since their movement was 
discovered, but seeing that it was xiseless to press the attack 
further, the enemy's troops were withdrawn, leaving, however, 
about seven hundred killed, wounded, and prisoners in our 
hands, over two hundred of them being in the ditch alone. 
The prisoners, numbering about three hundred, including 
seventeen officers, represented eleven regiments. Over one 
thousand stands of arms were left in our possession, f 

Considering the fact that G-eneral Lougstreet had the day 
before told his troops that our men were but raw recruits, who 
would run at their approach, and that he intended to eat his 
breakfast in Knoxville the next day, the result, so disasterons 
to them, was, to us, a most decisive victory — our loss was eight 
killed and five wounded, all told, and thirty captured. Two com- 
panies from the 2d, and four from the 1 7th Michigan were just 
entering the fort when the assault was repulsed and did not 
participate in the defense — about one half of our division 
and a portion of the second division were prepared to move to 
the threatened point should they be needed, while the reserve 
regiments were rapidly moving up. Thus, had the enemy 
succeodi'cl in occupying the fort, the guns from Fort Byington , 
and the batteries south of the river, bearing on the fort from 

* Mistaking tliese shells for misdirected shots from his own hatteries, Genera^ 
Longstreet sent orders to hi? artillery to cease firing. 

t From Pollard's (Confederate) " Third Year of the War," the following extract is 
taken : — 

" The force which was to attempt an enterprise which ranks with the most famous 
charges in military history, should be mentioned in detail. It consisted of three 
brigades of McLaw's division ; that of General Wolford, the Kith, 18th, and 24th 
Georgia regiments, and Cobb's and Phillip's Georgia legions ; that of General 
Humphrey's, the 13th, Hth, 3l8t, 32nd, and -i^rd Mississippi regiments; and a brigade 
composed of Generals Anderson's and Bryant's brigades, embracing, among others, the 
Palmetto State Guards, the loth South Carolina regi'uent, and tlie 51st, 53rd, and 59th 
Georgia regiments."— Pages 161, 162. 



EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 39 

the rear — which was uncovered — and the force of men we 
could have thrown upon that point would liave rendered it 
untenable. 

In a conversation with General Burnside, recently, he re- 
marked that "He would have defended that point with the 
entire strength of the army." 

Lines of telegraph connected all the forts on the defenses 
with headquarters, and, sleeping without undressing, and with 
an operator always on duty in the same room, there was little 
danger of an attack finding Burnside unprepared. 

Colonel O. M. Poe and Colonel E, P. Alexander, who held 
positions of Chief Engineer on the respective staffs of Generals 
Burnside and Longstreet, had been acquainted at West Point, 
before the war ; during the truce that General Burnside per- 
mitted, in which the dead and wounded were removed, these 
officers met near the ruins of the Armstrong House. Colonel 
Poe very naturally felt like bantering Colonel Alexander about 
the morning's work, and asked him " if they intended to try it 
again," which was answered m the negative. Colonel Alexan- 
der then said, " we didn't know there was a ditch in front of 
the fort ;" which was responded to by an invitation from Col- 
onel Poe to " go up and see it," but was politely declined, with 
" I am fully satisfied on that point." 

About 1 o'clock, p. m., procuring a temporary relief, I went 
up to the fort, where details of both our and the enemy's troops 
were engaged in removing the dead and wounded. I do not 
wish to revive the feeligs I experienced in looking at that ter- 
rible scene, nor could I adequately express them if I so desired. 

Picking up a good Enfield rifle, and cutting oft a button 
from a dead confederate officer's coat for a relic, I was hastening 
back, when on passing a man that I had previously noticed as 
dead — being fearfully mutilated — I caught a side glance of him 
shaking his head at me ; the effect was startling, and it was 
not till I had placed a long jump between the body and 
me, that I noticed that the man's head rested on one end of 
his gun, and owing to the inequality of the ground, my step- 



40 EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 

pi!ig Oil the other end had made him appear to shake his head. 
During tlie truce a good many of our men went down half- 
way and met an equal number of the enemy's skirmisher?, with 
whom a running fire of bantering and black-guardnig was 
kept up, till a gun from Fort Sanders ended the truce and the 
men resumed their respective positions. 

In a letter dated October 18, 1870, Colonel E. P. Alexander 
says, "J believe that I know as much or more of the assault 
on Fort Sanders than any one living, as I first proposed and 
planned it — not, however, as it was carried out — for several 
days' delay was caused by the arrival, upon the ground, of 
Bragg's engineer — General Leadbeater — who insisted on an 
attempt above the town, which however he gave up in a recon- 
noisance, and by an additional delay of one day of bad weather, 
during which General Leadbeater suddenly decided to give up 
the plan we had agreed upon, and try a surprise !!! ! — 1 was 
then too young and modest to say a word of objection, and the 
attempted surprise ended as you well know — though doubtless 
the attack was and will always remain a surprise to you, in one 
sense at least. ' I was in front of our lines during the flag of 
truce, in conversation with Fenero, Foe, Babcock and Benja- 
min (whom I had known previously) and I have a very good 
idea of the fort, and I believed then and still believe that it 
was (with all due respect for Colonel Foe) very faulty in pla?i, 
and very easy to take by a properly managed assault. We 
would have renewed it in a short while by main force, but 
just as it fixiled, a telegram from Richmond brought orders to 
raise the siege and go to Bragg at once ; so Longstreet accepted 
the flag and prepared to retreat southward that night, but that 
afternoon we heard from Bragg that he was whipped and 
gone beyond our reach ; so next day we determined to tiy you 
again, and, to satisfy everybody, made a reconnoisance of your 
whole line and decided again that we could take Fort San- 
ders. 

. " Before we got all ready again, the approach ot Sherman 
decided Longstreet to give up the attempt and retreat north- 
ward." 



EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 41 

The same officer in a letter, dated July 10th, ISGVj gives his 
reasons for the defeat as follows : " I attribute our failure to 
three causes : 1st. The troops were under arms and in position 
all night without food or fire and gave full warning of their 
purpose by taking the picket lines at 11 o'clock at night. 2d. 
The attempt was intended to be a surprise, and twenty-four 
guns and four howitzers, rigged as mortars, which had been 
prepared at cost of several days' delay, to enfilade the principal 
lines of the fort and the adjacent entrenchments, were not used 
at all, except as signals for the attack. 3d. Two brigades in- 
tended to go right and left of column of assault on capital, 
converged on that point, and the three commands became so 
intermingled that it was impossible to get anything done by 
either one. About two thousand men huddled together in 
this ' sector without fire,' and stood for ten or fifteen min- 
utes doing nothing as a mass, and then withdrew. We would 
have resumed the assault in an hour, but a telegram came 
from the war department in Kichmond, ordering us to move 
with all haste to j oin Bragg. That night as we were about 
to start, we heard of Bragg's defeat and retreat, and we then 
decided to fight it out at Knoxville, and made fresh recon- 
noisances and dispositions for attack. Probably at the same 
point, though some preferred a point further to our left where 
the railroad depot had been. I never thought that a good 
point however." 

General Longstreet in a letter dated July 12th, 1871, refers 
to the " second attack," mentioned by Colonel Alexander. 
" The supposed second attack on Fort Sanders is a decided 
error. Such a thought never occurred to me. At the moment of 
our repulse, B. R. Johnson, who had just joined me from Chat- 
tenooga with two brigades, and being a part of our supporting 
force, asked to be permitted, with his brigades, to continue the 
effort, but was ordered to desist, and orders were immediately 
given to withdraw our lines for the purpose of returning to the 
army at Chattenooga. It was at this moment that I received 
information, via Richmond, of the great discomfiiure of our 
6 



42 EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 

army at Chattenooga, and at the same time I received orders 
to withdraw, and go to the succor of that army. To have 
atteraptt-'d to obey this order would have placed Grant with 
his victorious army directly between our fragments, the greater 
force already beaten and in retreat. Our officers were called 
together and seemed inclined to try to rejoin the army through 
the mountains. This we might have accomplished in small 
detachments, but we could not have been of any service whilst 
engaged in the move. After due reflection, it seemed to me 
that there was only one thing left for me, a responsible ofiicer 
to do, that was to disregard orders and counsel, and renew the 
siege at Knoxville, with the hope that Grant must send a suc- 
coring force to save his garrison, and that, when he had made 
that detachment, he would not be strong enough to pursue the 
discomforted army that was in front of him." 

From that time forward, work was continued on our works, 
and no abatement of vigilance was allowed. The next day 
official news was received of the defeat of Bragg, and we began 
looking for reinforcements from Grant. Each day our rations 
grew less and less, and the pi-obability of holding out much 
longer became smaller in proportion. The plan of cutting our 
way out was discussed among the men, but thought imprac- 
ticable, as the troops were unfit for marching. It was equally 
certain, however, that the question of food was growing far 
too serious to remain as it was long. Some were sanguine 
that reinforcements would soon arrive, while others began to 
consider the probable hospitalities of Libby prison and the 
Andersonville pen with something of the seriousness they 
would have had if actually on the road. Whenever any of 
us could get off duty, we would stroll over to where the 
teamsters were feeding their mules ; should the teamsters be 
gone, the mules invariably lost their rations. Frequently the 
kernels of corn that the mules and horses could not help 
losing were picked up out of the dirt and eaten by the nearly 
famished troops. I shall never forget the expression of re- 
proach I fancied an old blind mule once gave me. He may 



EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 43 

have gone to sleep supperless that night, for all I know. I 
have never stopped to consider ; for my thoughts have never 
reverted to that incident witliout reviving the old unsettled 
question of " which, conscientiously, was the worst — stealing 
from a blind mule, that couldn't protect itself, or starving to 
death ? " The last days of the siege were passed with little 
to break the wearisome monotony of the routine of duty, ex- 
cept the wild rumors that ran along the lines every few 
hours, which, although stimulating for a time, added to a 
growing depression when they were found to be untrue. The 
meu were confident that nothing but lack of food could ever 
reduce the place, and nothing would have pleased us better 
than to have had the enemy try our lines at any point they 
desired. Indications of movements in the enemy's lines were 
the occasion, several times, of greater vigilance in ours ; and, 
as each day that passed, made the attack or retreat of the 
enemy more imminent, the greatest precautions were taken. 
The skirmishers were supplied with cotton balls saturated 
with turpentine, that, in case of an attack at night, were to 
to be lighted and thrown out to uncover an attacking column. 
Rockets were placed nlong the lines to be fired for the same 
purpose. In some places locomotive trucks and driving- 
wheels were fastened with ropes to stakes within our works, 
so that in the event of an assault, the ropes could be cut, and 
the trucks and wheels would roll down the hill. The creeks 
were dammed up, and the flats in front of portions of our 
lines were thus converted into ponds. All the extra arms that 
had been stored at the post, together with the arms captured 
at Fort Sanders, were issued, and fully one-half the troops 
had two guns each, which we kept mounted across the top 
of tlie works, a la Robinson Crusoe. 

During the afternoon of the 4th of December, the enemy's 
skirmishers were unusually active, and it became a matter of 
science to fire from our skirmish -pits without ^Jresenting a 
target for some of the enemy's bullets. To even move the 
green boughs we had placed above the pits with our guns, 



44 EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 

was sure to attract the attention of the enemy and provoke 
their fire. Our observations were thus necessarily somewhat 
disconnected; and when, every minute or two, we raised up 
to fire or take a view of the situation, it was invariably done 
on the principle of the most " situation " to the least time. 
Their fire Was so rapid that it was considered to be an indi- 
cation of an attack or to cover a movement ; and the former 
being generally accepted, the men stood under arms all the 
night following. Two or three times, when the skirmishers 
began firing, it was thought to be the initiation of an assault, 
and we expected every moment to have to resist the enemy's 
attack. The night wore away, and the morning revealed no 
sign of movement in the enemy's lines. The smoke was 
rising as usual from different portions of their pits, but the 
winds that came across to us gave rise to a suspicion, which 
at first was considered ominous. There was no sound afloat, 
and the extraordinary silence of the enemy created grave 
apprehensions of a guarded attack, a misapprehension which 
lasted but a few minutes, however, for cheering in the Plrst 
Brigade spread the intelligence of the discovery that the 
enemy had retreated, and the siege was raised. To say that 
we bore this news, together with that of the approach of General 
Sherman, soon afterward learned, with commendable resigna- 
tion, would hardly express our feelings, unless cheering until 
we were out of breath, and then, after going after our hats, 
which we had thrown away with the " tiger," shaking hands 
with every one we met, should be considered manifestations of 
that comfortable condition. 

The same day, toward noon. General Sherman's Aide-de- 
Camp arrived with the following cheering message from the 
General : " lam here at Marysville, and can bring 25,0C0 men 
into Knoxville to-morrow ; but Longstreet having retreated,! 
feel disposed to stop, for a stern chase is a long one ; but I will 
do all that is possible. Without you specify that you want 
troops, I tvill let mine rest to-morrow and ride in to see you. 
Send my aide, Captain Andenried, out with your letters to- 



EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 45 

night. We are all hearty, but tired. Accept my congratula- 
tions at your successful defense, and your patient endurance." 
On the 6th, General Burnside had a personal interview 
with General Shermanj and on the 1th addressed him the fol- 
lowing grateful acknowledgement ; he said : " I desire to 
express to you, and your command, my most hearty thanks 
and gratitude for your promptness in coming to our relief dur- 
ing the seige of Knoxville, and I am satisfied that your ap- 
proach served to raise the seige. The emergency having 
passed, I do not deem, for the present, any other portion 
of your command, than the corps of General Granger neces- 
sary for operations in this section. And, inasmuch as General 
Grant has weakened the forces immediately Aviih him in order 
to relieve us, thereby rendering portions of General Thomas' 
less secure, I think it advisable that all the troops now here, 
except those commanded by General Granger, should return at 
once to within supporting distance of the forces operating 
against General Bragg's army. In behalf of my command, I 
again desire to thank you and your command for the kindness 
you have done us." 

The successful defense of East Tennessee was considered of 
sufficient importance to warrant an official recognition, and 
on the Vth of December the President issued a proclamation 
referring in congratulatory terms to the retreat of the enemy 
from before Knoxville, " under the circumstances rendering it 
probable that the Union forces cannot hereafter be dislodged 
£rom that important position;" and recommending that "all 
loyal people do, on receipt of this information, assemble at 
their places of worship, and render special homage and grati- 
tude to Almighty God for this great advancement of the 
National cause." 

In regard to the conception of the plan of the campaign 
by General Bragg, an extract from a letter dated July 12, 1871, 
from General Longstreet will be of interest. He says " I have 
concluded to send you a copy of a letter written by me just 




46 EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 

on point of mounting my horse to start ujDon the East Ten- 
nessee Campaign — it was written after my tent was struck, 
sitting in the rain (a light drizzle), from the head of an empty 
flour barrel — but I think that, concise and hurridly as it was 
written, it plainly indicated that I understood what Grant's 
Campaign would be, that is, I understood the conditions and 
situations of the two armies well enough to know what Grant 
should do, and it is nearly always safe to assume, with such a 
man, that he will do what he should do. Seeing the letter, 
that I send a copy of, amongst my papers that I was overlook- 
ing, I determined to send it, in order that you might be assured 
of our force and of my appreciation of the campaign when it 
was jjrojected by General Bragg." 

Headquaktees, Chattenooga, Nov. 5, 1863. 
S. B. BucKNER, Major General. 
My Dear General, 

I start to- day for Tyuer's Station, and expect to get transportation 
to-morrow for Sweet Water. 

The weather is so bad, and I find myself so much occupied, that I 
shall not be able to see you to say good bye. 

When I heard the report, around camp, that I was to go into East 
Tennessee, I set to work at once to try and plan the means of making 
the move with security, and the hope of great results. 

As every other move had been proposed to the General and rejected, 
or put off till time made them more inconvenient, I came to the con- 
clusion, as soon as the report reached me, that this was to be the fate of 
our army : to await till all good opportunities had passed, and then, 
in desperation, to seize upon the least favorable one. 

As no one had proposed this East Tennessee campaign to the 
General, I thought it possible that we might accomplish something by 
encouraging his own move, and proposed the following plan, viz. : To 
withdraw from our present lines, and the forces now in East Ten- 
nessee — (the latter to be done in order to give the impression to the 
enemy that we were retiring Irom East Tennessee, and concentrating 
near here for battle or for some other movement) — and place our army 
in a strong (concentrated) position. 

The moment the army was together, make a detachment of twenty 
thousand to move rapidly against Burnside, and destroy him ; and by 
continued rapid movements to threaten the enemy's rear and his com- 
muuicalious to the extent that might be necessary to draw him out 



EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 47 

trom his present position. This at best is a tedious process, but I 
thought it gave promise of some result, and was therefore better than 
lying here, destroying ourselves. 

The move, as I proposed it, would have left this army in a strong 
position and safe, and would have made sure the capture of Burnside. 

That is, the army here could spare twenty thousand if it were in the 
position that I proposed, better than it can spare twelve, occupying the 
lines that it now does. Twenty thousand men, well handled, could 
surely have captured Burnside and forces. Under present arrange- 
ments, however, the lines are to be held as they now are, and the de- 
tachment is to be of say twelve thousand. We thus expose both to 
failure, and really take no chance to ourselves of great results. 

The only notice my plan received was a remark that General Hardee 
was pleased to make : " I don't thmk that that is a bad idea of Long- 
street's." I undertook to explain the danger of having such a long 
line under the fire of the enemy's batteries, and he concentrated, as it 
were, right in our midst, and within twenty minutes' march of any por- 
tion of our line. But I was assured that he would not disturb us. 

I repeated my ideas, but they did not even receive notice. T'was not 
till I had repeated it, however, that General Hardee even noticed me. 

Have you any maps that you can give or lend me. I shall need 
every thing of the kind. 

Do you know any reliable people living near and east of Knoxville 
from whom I might get information of the condition, strength, &c., of 
the enemy. 

I have written in such hurry and confusion of packing and striking 
camp, that I doubt if I have made myself understood. 
I remain, very sincerely, your friend, 
(Signed) J. LONGSTREET, ■ 

Lieutenant General. 

It is not my desire that this article should be a criticism on 
the conduct of the campaign, either joro or con; my experience 
was quite too limited, and my position too circumscribed to 
admit of exhaustive or critical comments. It will not be 
overstepping the boundary of truth, however, to say that the 
part the Ninth Corps took in the campaign, was one that they 
may ever look back to with pride. Nor were we. or are we 
now, iinwilling to admit the pluck and bravery of Longstreet's 
troops, especially at the assault on Fort Sanders, where it may 
be more reasonably assumed that they bravely attempted to 
carry out orders, which they found it impossible to execute, 



48 EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 

from the nature of the " obstructions" which they encountered, 
rather than, as Colonfel Alexander lucidly (?) explains, because 
" the Fort was very faulty in jjlan, and very easy to take." 

It the Tennessee campaign had ended on the 5th of Decem- 
ber, my recollections of it would be influenced as we were 
then, when the joy we felt was considered compensation for 
all the preceding fatigue and privations. Notwithstanding 
the winter that followed was made memorable and miserable 
by the fatigue and privations troops endured, the remembrance 
of the battle of Campbell station and the siege of Knoxville 
ai'e full of interest, which no subsequent experience has, or 
ever can erase from my memory. 



RECOLLECTIONS 



East Tennessee Campaign. 



BATTLE OF CAMPBELL STATION, 16th Nov., 1863; 
SIEGE OF KNOXVILLE, 17th Nov.— 5th Dec, 1863. 



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